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Abstract
Emerging market economies in the nineteen nineties have experienced periods of
booms followed by collapses in gross domestic product, consumption, traded and non-
traded sector output and real exchange rate movements alongside unprecedented move-
ments in foreign investor participation in these economies. An important feature of
these episodes is the asymmetry in the pattern of booms and collapses. We introduce
a natural search friction into the foreign investment decision in a small open economy
and demonstrate that this can generate both the gradual appreciations in the real ex-
change rate and growth in production during expansions and the asymmetrically sharp
downward adjustment during contractions. The magnitude of the reversals predicted by
the model can be quantitatively large and empirically relevant. The adjustment hazard
model of investment we present generates predictions that diﬀer qualitatively from the
standard quadratic adjustment cost model of investment.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Emerging market economies in the nineteen nineties have experienced periods of booms
followed by collapses in gross domestic product, consumption, traded and non-traded sector
output and real exchange rate movements alongside unprecedented movements in foreign
investor participation in these economies. The empirical stylized facts of this phenomenon
have been documented extensively in Calvo-Leiderman-Reinhart (1996), Calvo-Reinhart
(1999) and Glick (1998). An important feature of these episodes is the asymmetry in the
pattern of booms and collapses. Booms have been associated with gradual appreciations in
the real exchange rate and growth in production and consumption. Collapses on the other
hand have involved dramatic reversals with sharp contractions in GDP, relative price of
non-traded goods, the real exchange rate and large exit of foreign investors from the crisis
economy. This paper presents a theoretical framework to explain the boom and collapse
episodes of emerging economies with speci￿c emphasis on the asymmetry of the process.
The model describes a micro-foundation based adjustment friction in foreign investor entry
and exit into a small open economy. The predictions are shown to diﬀer qualitatively from
a framework where the friction is modeled as a quadratic adjustment cost in investment as
is the case in the standard q model of investment.
We describe a small open economy with return seeking foreign investment ￿ows. The
source of friction in these ￿ows emerges from information imperfections about investment
returns in the emerging markets. Investment ￿projects￿ are characterized by idiosyncratic
returns and the type of the project can be determined only through a time consuming search
process. The decision to invest, accordingly, weighs the return from a current project against
the outside option and the option value of further search. The endogenously determined
entry and exit decision for the foreign investor generates dynamics in the path of net project
creation that in turn generate the responses of real variables that has been observed in
emerging market economies.
Our model is distinct from the earlier literature in that it incorporates the direct eco-
nomic eﬀects of a friction in foreign investor entry and exit decisions in a small open economy.
Accordingly it generates the sharp reversals in foreign investor participation observed in
2these economies. The existing theoretical literature can be broadly divided into two strands
of explanations. One set of explanations rely on the inter-temporal consumption smooth-
ing mechanism to obtain dynamics in the real exchange rate. Several papers (Calvo-Vegh
(1993)) that model exchange rate based stabilization programs that are imperfectly credible
rely on this mechanism. Since the empirical evidence on intertemporal substitution is weak,
Rebelo-Vegh (1995) who survey explanations based on exchange rate based stabilizations
in high in￿ation economies conclude that it is ￿very diﬃcult to explain the magnitude of
the real appreciation and consumption booms￿ on the basis of these explanations. More-
over, these papers do not address the asymmetric adjustment that we observe. In more
recent work, Calvo-Mendoza (2000) and Mendoza (2001) combine this mechanism with
an ￿occasionally binding￿ credit constraint to generate ￿sudden stops￿ when fundamentals
deteriorate. We describe a mechanism where symmetric shocks to fundamentals generate
asymmetric responses even when the constraint (adjustment friction) is always eﬀective.
A second strand of the literature extends the Kiyotaki-Moore credit-cycle mechanism to
generate dynamics in the real exchange rate. Aghion-Bacchetta-Banerjee (1999) generate
equilibria with endogenous cycles in the relative price of non-traded goods and investment.
Tornell-Schneider (2000) combine bailout guarantees with the credit cycle mechanism to
generate self-ful￿lling boom-bust phenomena. Both these papers however do not address
the asymmetry of the adjustment process1. In this paper we examine phenomena that
are not limited to exchange rate based stabilization episodes and is therefore closer to the
sudden stops analysis surveyed in Arellano-Mendoza (2002).
The application of search theory to investment is uncommon in the literature. However
it seems natural to consider search frictions in foreign investment. The mechanism de-
scribed has the following features. Foreign investors seeks high return investment projects
in an emerging market. They invest in projects that engage in real activity in the emerging
market and generate a stream of returns for the investor. Foreign Investors are constrained
in their investment decisions by the need to determine the idiosyncratic type of the project
1Tornell-Schneider (2000) discuss a diﬀerent asymmetry that relates to the diﬀerence in the post-crisis
recovery dynamics between the traded and non-traded sector.
3through a time consuming evaluation process and face an endogenously determined adjust-
ment hazard. The investor has an incentive to search for a project with high idiosyncratic
returns and investment decisions will incorporate the option value to waiting. Domestic
households bene￿t from the higher income earned from the projects. At any point in time
we observe both so called ￿project creation￿ when new projects get activated by foreign
investors and ￿project destruction￿ when foreign investors withdraw from projects. The
prolonged appreciation in the real exchange rate and gradual expansion in GDP, traded
sector output and measure of active projects, in response to an improvement in investment
fundamentals is a consequence of the optimal decisions of investors to wait and seek good
matches. On the other hand, in response to a deterioration in fundamentals, previously
good matches now provide inadequate returns and one observes a sudden rise in project
destruction that in turn generates the asymmetrically sharp contraction in GDP, traded
sector output, measure of active projects and real exchange rate. In Section 3 we calibrate
the parameters of the model and quantitatively evaluate the impact of shocks to traded
sector productivity and ￿xed costs of investment. The impact eﬀect and long-run eﬀect
of these shocks are contrasted between two scenarios: when the economy moves from a
good state to a bad state and vice versa. The asymmetry in adjustment is quantitatively
important. For instance, a 6.5% increase in traded sector productivity, when the economy
moves permanently to the good state, is shown to raise GDP on impact by 1.69% and in the
long-run by 5.15%. In contrast, a drop in traded sector productivity as the economy moves
to the bad state, is shown to generate a 7.17% drop in GDP on impact, with a long-run
decline of 4.9%. The magnitude of the reversals predicted by the model can be quite large
and comparable to estimates obtained in the data.
The model of investment ￿ows we present can be viewed as an ￿adjustment hazard￿ model
of investment ￿ows across borders. It is therefore useful to compare it with the standard
work-horse model of adjustment dynamics in investment-the quadratic adjustment cost q
model of investment. Our approach separates the gross ￿ows underlying the net investment
process and this separation makes important predictions for the adjustment path of net
investment. Symmetric positive and negative shocks generate asymmetric responses in
the adjustment path of net project creation. In the standard q model the adjustment is
4symmetric2.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we describe the model. In Section
3, we discuss the parameter values used to calibrate the model. Section 4 describes the
steady state characteristics of the economy and Section 5 analyzes the dynamic adjustment
response of the economy. Finally, we conclude in Section 6.
2 The Model
The model describes a small open-economy with two types of agents-the domestic household
and the foreign investor. We describe the latter in Section 2.1 and the former in Section
2.2. There are two types of goods -a traded good (t) and a non-traded (nt) good. The
traded good is treated as the numeraire. The price of the non-traded good in terms of the
traded good is p.
2.1 The Foreign Investor
Investment opportunities in the small open-economy are described by ￿projects￿ that are
associated with domestic households. These projects produce traded goods using non-
traded goods as inputs. The per period pro￿t from a project is given by πt,t (θ) where
θ represents the idiosyncratic return from the project. Foreign participation is viewed as
improving the eﬃciency of the projects. To simplify the analysis, we assume that πt,t (θ)
is strictly positive only when associated with a foreign agent3. Accordingly, in the absence
of foreign participation, these projects become inactive. As long as the project remains
active the foreign and domestic agent share pro￿ts according to a fraction τ and (1 − τ)
respectively.
2Caballero (1997) and Caballero-Engel (1998) have a series of papers on a more general q model in which
they assume asymmetric stochastic adjustment cost functions. Our model derives the stochastic adjustment
process based on a speci￿c friction in the investment process and is therefore micro-founded.
3This extreme assumption is not necessary for the qualitative results we derive. All we require is that
there is some negative eﬀect of the withdrawal of foreign investment on the real activity of the project.
5The production function for a type θ project in the traded sector is as below,
yt,t (θ)=θ + ztxα
n,t (1)
z is a measure of the aggregate level of productivity in the traded sector (and is determin-
istic). xn,t is the quantity of non-traded goods used as inputs in production.
A risk neutral foreign investor is endowed with φ units of the traded good every period,
which he must decide between investing or reinvesting in project θ or investing in the
international capital market at the risk free world interest rate of r. First, consider a foreign
investor who is invested in a type θ project. The idiosyncratic type of the project θ is
assumed to stay constant over time. At the start of every period, the investor decides
whether to reinvest in the project or exit the project. If he exits, he enters the pool of
searchers in the following period and draws from a distribution of projects represented by
G(θ). G(θ) is assumed to be unchanging over time. In addition, there is an exogenous
probability of shut-down δ each period after the ￿rm produces at time t, in which case once
again the investor enters the pool of searchers in t +1 .( β is the time discount rate)4.
The asset value of a type θ project for a foreign investor, Rt(θ) is then
Rt(θ)=τπt,t (θ)+β(1 − δ)Vt+1(θ)+βEθVt+1(θ) (2)
where
Vt(θ)=m a x [ Rt(θ),(1 + r)φ + βEθVt+1(θ)] (3)
Vt(θ) is the value to the investor of choosing optimally between investing in a project of type
θ or not. The asset value Rt(θ) incorporates the possibility that the investor will choose to
exit from the project in the future. An investor will be indiﬀerent between exiting a project
and reinvesting in a project as long as the value from exiting (1 + r)φ + βEθVt+1(θ) and
from reinvesting Rt(θ) are equal. There is an optimal cut-oﬀ exit condition ￿ θt such that
foreign agents will exit all projects of type θ < ￿ θt and retain their investment in all types
θ ≥ ￿ θt.
4The per-period cost of investment could have alternatively been denominated in terms of a bundle of
traded and non-traded goods. This would not alter the main results.
6Next, consider an investor who is currently in the pool of searchers. The search as-
sumption captures the idea that foreign investors are faced with heterogenous investment
opportunities and in the absence of adequate information regarding the types of projects
in emerging markets need to determine the type of a project through a time-consuming
process. Accordingly, foreign investment is not frictionless. This assumption of informa-
tion imperfections is ￿nding empirical support in recent literature on the determinants of
capital ￿ows across borders (Ghosh-Wolf (1999), Portes-Rey (2000))5.T h ei m p o r t a n c eo f
searching for investment projects is relevant for most capital ￿ows where the investor when
faced with several options invests time and money to determine the optimal investment.
Since investors are allowed to exit the economy relatively quickly we do not restrict capital
￿ows to long-term investments.
Every period a searching investor draws a project from the distribution G(θ) and deter-
mines its type. If they choose to invest φ in the asset they obtain Rt(θ) a n di ft h e yc h o o s e
to continue searching they obtain (1 + r)φ + βEθVt+1(θ). The decision rule for a searching
investor is therefore identical to the one faced by the foreign investor who is attached to
a project and has to decide between re-investing or exiting each period. Accordingly, we
de￿ne ￿ θt to be the cut-oﬀ level of idiosyncratic productivity such that a matched investor
will be indiﬀerent between staying with the project or exiting the project, and a searching
investor will be indiﬀerent between accepting the project and rejecting it to search again.
￿ θt =i n f{θ ∈ [θL,θH]:Rt(θ) ≥ (1 + r)φ + βEθVt+1(θ)}. (4)
￿ θt is both the entry cut-oﬀ for the searching investor and the exit cut-oﬀ for the matched
investor. The adjustment hazard for an individual investor is represented by (1 − G(￿ θt)).
That is, with a probability of (1 − G(￿ θt)) the investor will expect to successfully invest.
Since ￿ θt is a forward looking variable the adjustment hazard term incorporates information
about the expected future path of returns. Investors will reject projects that provide them
with a return less than the world interest rate and will be more selective the higher the
option value to waiting. As long as foreign investors limit the amount they are willing to
5Portes-Rey (2000) conclude from an empirical study that the geography of information is a crucial
determinant of the pattern of international transactions.
7invest in an emerging market so that it isn￿t the case that all pro￿table projects in emerging
markets get absorbed immediately the incentive to search will be high. The evidence on
supply of capital to emerging markets suggests that capital ￿o w sa c r o s sb o r d e r si sl i m i t e d
for several reasons including the high level of political risk, adjustment costs, congestion
eﬀects and home-bias in preferences.
We assume that there is a ￿xed pool of foreign investors of measure one that seeks
investment opportunities in the emerging economy. We de￿ne ηt to be the measure of
investors that are searching at the start of time t. mt(θ) is the mass of investors with
project θ at time t, after the entry and exit decisions but before exogenous exit (which
takes place with probability δ). mt(θ) evolves as
mt(θ)=( 1 − δ)mt−1(θ)+ηtg(θ). if θ ≥ ￿ θt (5)
=0 if θ < ￿ θt
mt(θ) includes all surviving active projects from period t − 1 whose idiosyncratic return
continues to be above the cut-oﬀ and new matches of type θ.
The measure of searching investors includes all investors who continue searching from
the previous period and all investors who endogenously and exogenously exit from their
matches.
ηt =
Z ￿ θt−1
θL
ηt−1dG(θ)+( 1− δ)
Z ￿ θt−1
θL
mt−2(θ)dθ + δmt−1 (6)
mt =
R θH
θL mt(θ)dθ. Given that there is a ￿xed total pool of investment seekers of measure
one, the relation between the measure of searching investors and active projects is given by
ηt +( 1− δ)
Z θH
θL
mt−1(θ)dθ =1 (7)
The evolution of the total measure of active projects is then
mt = mt−1 + ηt(1 − G(￿ θt)) −
"
(1 − δ)
Z ￿ θt
θL
mt−1(θ)dθ + δmt−1
#
(8)
The level of what we shall call project creation at any point of time is then, Ct =
R θH
￿ θt ηtdG(θ)
and the so-called level of project destruction is Dt =
h
(1 − δ)
R ￿ θt
θL mt−1(θ)dθ + δmt−1
i
.
82.2 The Domestic Household
The domestic economy is comprised of identical in￿nitely lived households and the measure
of these households is normalized to one. Households consume both traded and non-traded
goods. They produce non-traded goods Yn, which they supply in a perfectly competitive
market. They are endowed with a ￿xed amount of traded goods ﬂ ω every period and share
in the pro￿ts of the traded sector (1−τ)Πt,t. They can also borrow (B) and lend from the
rest of the world at an interest rate rt (paid in terms of tradables). In this framework there
is only ￿rm level uncertainty and no aggregate uncertainty.
The representative household maximizes a life-time utility function of the form
max
{Ct,t}∞
t=0,{Cn,t}∞
t=0
{Yn,t}∞
t=0,{Bt+1}∞
t=0
"
∞ X
t=0
βt
h
γ logCt,t +( 1− γ)logCn,t −
κ
2
(Yn,t)
2
i#
(9)
subject to the following ￿ow budget constraint.
(1 + rt)Bt + Ct,t + ptCn,t ≤ ﬂ ω + ptYn,t +( 1− τ)Πt,t + Bt+1 (10)
Ct,t is the consumption of traded goods at time t and Cn,t is the consumption of non-traded
goods at time t. The term −κ
2 (Yn,t)
2 captures the disutility the individual experiences from
producing non-traded output. Bt+1 represents the level of foreign debt in terms of traded
goods held by domestic residents at the end of period t. Πt,t is the aggregate level of pro￿ts
in the traded goods sector. The no-Ponzi constraint requires that
lim
j→∞
Bt+j
Π
j
s=1(1 + rs)
≤ 0 (11)
The interest rate faced by households is assumed to be sensitive to the level of debt.
We assume the interest rate rule employed by Mendoza and Uribe (2000), Schmitt-Grohe
and Uribe (2001) wherein the interest rate is increasing in the country￿s level of net foreign
debt. This assumption resolves the non-stationarity of debt problem that is typical in small
open economy models where households have access to a risk free bond whose interest
rate is determined exogenously abroad. See Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2001) for a detailed
discussion of this issue.
91+rt =1+r + f( ￿ Bt) (12)
where
f( ￿ Bt)=ψ
‡
eBt− ﬂ B − 1
·
(13)
ﬂ B is the steady state level of debt, r is the risk-free world interest rate and (1 + r)β =1 .
Household optimization then requires that the following ￿rst-order conditions hold,
Ct,t+1 =[ ( 1+rt)β]Ct,t (14)
The optimal choice of Cn,t implies
Cn,t =
￿
1 − γ
γ
¶￿
1
pt
¶
Ct,t (15)
Equation (15) is the equilibrium condition for intra-temporal allocation between traded and
non-traded goods. Finally, the optimal choice of Yn,t implies
Yn,t =
γ
κ
pt
Ct,t
(16)
The marginal cost of producing another unit of the non-traded good, κYn,t, should equal
the marginal bene￿t,
γpt
Ct,t . Optimization also requires that the household exhaust its in-
tertemporal budget constraint looking forward from every date t.
The real exchange rate e is de￿ned as the ratio of the home consumption-based price
index (P) 6 to the rest-of-the-world price index (P∗),e t = Pt
P∗
t =
‡
pt
p∗
t
·1−γ
. In a small open
economy p∗
t is taken as given at every date t. The behavior of the real exchange rate then
mimics the behavior of the home price of non-traded goods in terms of traded goods pt.
6It can be shown that Pt =
p
1−γ
t
γγ(1−γ)1−γ and P
∗
t = (p∗
t)
1−γ
γγ(1−γ)1−γ . (where we have assumed that preferences
are the same in both countries). We have imposed the condition that there is purchasing power parity in
tradables across countries.
102.3 Aggregation and Market Clearing Conditions
Aggregate demand for the non-traded good from the traded goods sector is
Xn,t =
Z θH
θL
mt(θ)xn,tdθ (17)
Aggregate level of output and pro￿ts in the traded sector is given by equations (18) and
(19) respectively.
Yt,t =
Z θH
θL
yt(θ)mt(θ)dθ (18)
Πt,t = Yt,t − ptXn,t (19)
The goods-market clearing condition for non-traded goods is
Yn,t = Cn,t + Xn,t (20)
The current account is then7
−Bt+1 + Bt =ﬂ ω +( 1− τ)Yt,t + τptXn,t − Ct,t + rtBt (21)
De￿nition 1 A search equilibrium is a sequence of the household￿s decisions {Ct,t,Cn,t,Y n,t,B t+1},
foreign investors decisions that determine
n
￿ θt
o
,real exchange rate {pt}, the measure of
searching investors {ηt}, the distribution of active projects {mt (θ)} a n dt r a d e ds e c t o ro u t -
put {Yt,t} such that conditions (10-16), (3-8), and (17-21) hold, given initial conditions
{B0,η0,{m−1 (θ)}} and exogenous state {zt,φt,G(θ)}
3 Parameter Values
In this section we describe the parameter values used to calibrate the model. A period in
the model is equated to a quarter. The parameter values are taken from existing literature
and average values for certain Latin American economies where available. Some fairly
standard parameters are γ, the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between traded and
non-traded goods in the consumption bundle. We set this at 0.5 as in Rebelo-Vegh (1995).
The discount rate β is set at 0.99 which corresponds to a quarterly world interest rate r of
7We assume pro￿ts earned by foreign agents are repatriated to the foreign investors home country.
111.01%. For ψ, the coeﬃcient on the interest rate premium, we use the value of 0.000742,
which is the value used by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2001) and implies that the interest
rate faced by consumers is very close to the risk-free rate. Accordingly, consumption of
traded goods adjusts very quickly to its long-run value. This property is useful for our
analysis as we can focus on the transition dynamics that arise from search and evolution of
projects.
To determine the choice of κ, the disutility parameter in the utility function from pro-
duction of non-traded goods, we perform the following analysis as in Obstfeld-Rogoﬀ (1996).
It can be shown that the disutility term in the utility function is equivalent to the case where
the production function in the non-traded sector is y = Alαt and the disutility of supplying
labor in the utility function is −al with αt set equal to 0.5. An αt of 0.5 is a reasonable
measure of the share of labor in the non-traded sector. It is an average of the value used
by Mendoza (2001) of 0.364 and the value used by Rebelo-Vegh (1995) of 0.63. Given this
value for αt and normalizing a and A t o1w eh a v eav a l u ef o rκ of 2.
The parameters that are more speci￿ct ot h i sm o d e la r eδ, the steady state project
destruction rate and G(θ), the exante distributon of the pool of projects. We use evidence
from ￿rm level data to calibrate these parameters. In the absence of well known studies
for emerging markets we rely on the analysis of Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson(1988) who
examine the pattern of ￿rm entry and exit in the U.S. 4 digit manufacturing industries
(the relevant group for tradables sector) over the period 1963-1982 using data from census
years. They de￿ne entry (exit) rates for industry i between census years t − 1 and t as the
ratio of the number of ￿rms that enter (exit) industry i between census year t − 1 and t to
total number of ￿rms in industry i in census year t−1. Entry and exit rates are calculated
to average close to 0.5 for the 5 year interval across census periods. The rates for U.S.
￿rms are found to be fairly close to the numbers for the Canadian manufacturing sector as
surveyed in Baldwin, Gorecki (1991) during the period 1970-82. In our model, the measure
of entry and exit rate that corresponds precisely to the de￿nition used in Dunne, Roberts,
Samuelson(1988) is what we call the creation rate CRt and destruction rate DRt.
CRt =
R θ∗
￿ θt ηtdG(θ)
mt−1
12DRt =
h
(1 − δ)
R ￿ θt
0 mt−1(θ)dθ + δmt−1
i
mt−1
In steady state, as the measure of active ￿rms m stays unchanged over time and
R ￿ θt
0 mt−1(θ)dθ
is equal to zero the exit rate and entry rate are exactly equal to δ. Accordingly, we set
δ =0 .025.
The functional form we employ for the distribution of ￿rm idiosyncratic productivity is a
uniform distribution. We choose values for θL and θH so as to match evidence on dispersion
of ￿rm productivity in the manufacturing sector. Bartelsman and Doms (2000) perform the
analysis for the U.S. They compute the ratio of average total factor productivity for plants
in the ninth decile of the productivity distribution relative to the average in the second decile
and ￿nd that the ratio varies between 2:1 in 1972 and 2-3/4 to 1 in 1987, with numbers as
high as 4:1 for speci￿c industries. Tybout (2000) surveys the evidence for manufacturing
￿rms in developing countries, cautioning against the accuracy of the results given the quality
of the data and methodology used. Evidence on dispersion relative to developed countries
is mixed. Earlier evidence suggested that cross-￿rm variance in productivity level is high
in developing countries while more recent evidence suggests otherwise. We try to match
an intermediate dispersion number of 2.75. Normalizing θL to 1, θH i ss e ta t5 . T h i s
parameterization is clearly subject to the caveat that we are not matching all moments of
the distribution of ￿rm productivity and accordingly has its limitations.
ﬂ B and ω are chosen such that the debt to GDP ratio is 0.35, which corresponds to the
average debt to gdp ratio for Mexico between 1970-1997 as computed by Mendoza(2001).
The initial level of aggregate productivity in the traded sector z is normalized to 1. For
α we use a value of 0.6, which implies that the elasticity of response of non-traded goods
used as inputs in the production of traded goods to a change in p is 2.5. It is important
to note that α does not correspond to the share of the cost of non-traded inputs in traded
sector revenue. Infact it is necessarily lower than this ratio as given by equation (22) below.
Given the choice of other parameters, this ratio is 0.0415 in our experiments.
pX
Y
=
p
‡
αz
p
· 1
1−α m
R
θm(θ)dθ +
R
zxα
Nm(θ)dθ
(22)
13Lastly, we need to pick values for φ, the per-period ￿xed cost of investing in the emerging
economy and τ, the fraction of pro￿ts in the traded sector that accrue to foreign investors.
Unfortunately there is no clear way of selecting these values. A high φ and low τ reduces
the incentive to invest in the emerging market. Our benchmark φ i ss e ta t4a n dτ at 0.8.
This implies that in steady state the fraction of searching investors in the potential pool of
foreign investors is 0.57. We will discuss the sensitivity of our results to alternate values of
φ in Section 5. The benchmark parameter values are summarized in Table 1.
4 The Economy in Steady State
The equilibrium equations can be written in the form Γt+1 = g(Γt,z t,φt) where Γ represents
the vector of endogenous variables and the steady state is the solution to the equation Γ =
g(Γ,z,φ). There is no known closed form solution to these set of equations and accordingly
the steady state values are obtained numerically as the solution to a system of non-linear
equations, given the parameter values in Table 1.
Proposition 2 There exists a unique entry and exit cut-oﬀ ￿ θ, for a given p and the cut-oﬀ
is strictly increasing in p.
Proof. See Appendix A.1
Figure 1 depicts the steady state response of the relative price of non-traded goods to
changes in aggregate traded sector productivity z,and changes in the ￿xed cost of investment
φ. Ah i g h e rz implies that a searching investor would be willing to accept a project with a
lower idiosyncratic return. The asset value of the previously marginal project is now higher.
The expected return from search is also higher, as the change in z is permanent. The rise
in the asset value of the marginal project is shown to be greater than the rise in the search
option and this implies a decline in the idiosyncratic type of the marginal acceptable project.
Consequently, more projects are accepted. It can be shown that m =
1−G(￿ θ)
1−G(￿ θ)(1−δ), and is
therefore a decreasing function of the cut-oﬀ ￿ θ. That is, the more selective the investment
and the higher the likelihood of exiting the market, the lower the measure of active projects
14in the economy. With a larger measure of active projects the demand for domestic resources
rises, pushing up the real exchange rate. A higher ￿xed cost of investment φ has a similar
eﬀect on p as a lower z and the argument follows as before. In the next section, we evaluate
the transitional dynamics for an economy subject to unanticipated permanent changes in z
and φ.
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Figure 2 plots the steady state distribution of active projects for two values of the
aggregate level of traded sector productivity, z1 <z 2. The intuition for the asymmetry in
response to shocks to z and φ (that will be demonstrated in the following section) can be
seen here . When the economy moves from a steady state corresponding to z1 to a higher
level z2, the cut-oﬀ level of idiosyncratic productivity falls. This induces more entry and
reinvestment. Since the new cut-oﬀ lies to the left of the old, the mass of active projects in
r a n g eb e t w e e nt h ec u t - o ﬀs is necessarily zero. On the other hand, when the economy moves
15from z2 to z1 the cut-oﬀ is higher which lowers entry and reinvestment. Simultaneously,
there is an immediate destruction of a strictly positive mass of projects that were worthy
of investment in the state when aggregate traded sector productivity was high, but now
are no longer viable. This additional destruction generates an asymmetry as the economy
moves between good and bad states.
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5 Asymmetric Responses: Gradual Expansions and Sharp
Contractions
In this section, we examine the dynamic adjustment path of an economy that is character-
ized by the search friction in foreign investment ￿ows. Several emerging market economies
in the nineteen nineties that exhibited the boom-real exchange rate appreciation phenom-
16enon and subsequent sharp reversals experienced unprecedented levels of foreign investment
in￿ows. The stimulus behind the increased ￿ows to these economies has been attributed to a
combination of improved domestic investment conditions and to worsening external factors
such as lower returns on the U.S. stock market (Calvo-Leiderman-Reinhardt (1993)). The
source of the reversal in the boom is a subject of greater debate. Aghion-Bacchetta-Banerjee
(1999) for instance, describe an endogenous downturn along the lines of the Kiyotaki-Moore
credit cycle mechanism. In Mendoza (2001), sources of the sudden stop are a negative shock
to traded sector productivity, positive shock to world real interest rates and shocks to the
tax rate. The experiment we consider is the response of the economy to permanent unan-
ticipated changes in two variables: traded sector productivity z, and changes in the ￿xed
cost of investment φ. The main purpose of these experiments is to demonstrate the natural
asymmetry in the adjustment path of the economy with the economy expanding gradually
in response to positive shocks to z and φ and contracting sharply in response to negative
shocks.
As a measure of the shock to traded sector productivity, we use the standard deviation
in traded sector productivity estimated for Mexico by Mendoza(2001) of 3.36%. In our
simulations we determine the response of the economy to a two standard deviation shock to
traded sector productivity. More precisely, we consider the impulse response of an economy
as it moves from zlo to zhi and vice-versa, where zhi is 6.5% higher than zlo.
Since we are interested in the asymmetric response of the economy to positive and
negative shocks, we cannot use linearization methods to solve for the dynamic response of
the economy. Accordingly, we employ non-linear methods to obtain the solution which takes
the form of a shooting algorithm. This is described in Appendix 2. The endogenous state
space includes the entire distribution of active projects mt−1(θ), the measure of searching
investors ηt, and level of household debt Bt.
The solid lines in Figure 3 plot the impulse responses of the economy as it moves
permanently from zlo to zhi. T h ei n c r e a s ei nz makes investment in the projects more
attractive to the foreign investor. The cut-oﬀ ￿ θ declines on impact and more projects
are accepted by investors who would previously have preferred to continue searching. All
17adjustment does not take place instantaneously because of the search friction. Investors
will match slowly over time and we observe strictly positive net project creation along the
transition path. Speci￿cally, net project creation rises and declines along the transition
path. This adjustment path is similar to the prediction one would obtain with quadratic
adjustment costs. The asymmetry of the adjustment process is what distinguished the two
frictions.
As more projects get activated, the demand for non-traded inputs in the expanding
traded sector rise. This raises output and pro￿ts in the non-traded sector and the higher
income to households from the traded sector causes consumption to rise. In a small open
economy, with a perfectly elastic supply of traded goods, the increased demand for non-
traded goods will result in an increase in the relative price of non-traded goods. The
real exchange rate therefore appreciates. The gradualness of the expansion follows from
the behavior of the measure of active projects, which monotonically increases over time
owing to the search friction. Accordingly, the relative price of non-traded goods, p and the
RER appreciates on impact and continues to appreciate till it reaches its higher steady
state value. Gross domestic product, ﬂ ω + ptYn,t + Πt,t and traded sector output similarly
undershoot their long-run values. The consumption of traded goods Ct, adjusts almost
instantaneously to its long-run value, since the interest rate premium parameter is set at
very close to zero. Since incomes of households are rising over time and consumers wish to
smooth consumption they borrow from the rest of the world, resulting in current account
de￿cits. Aggregate consumption in terms of traded goods also increases. C
γ
tC
1−γ
nt rises on
impact and declines along the transition path to a higher steady state level8.
Next, we consider the response of the economy as it moves from zhi to zlo. The solid
lines in Figure 4 plots the impulse responses. When the economy adjusts from zhi to zlo
the cut-oﬀ increases on impact as the idiosyncratic return of the project required to ensure
an adequate return to the investor is now higher. Projects that would have previously
been accepted by searching investors are now rejected. Project creation therefore declines.
8In the data, consumption gradually increases over time as opposed to overshooting. Uribe (2002) explores
the role of habit formation in preferences in generating this trend.
18Simultaneously, there exists a range of projects, between the previous cut-oﬀ and the new
cut-oﬀ that were previously considered worthy of reinvestment but now get shut-down. As
discussed in Section 4, the corresponding adjustment does not exist when the economy moves
from zlo to zhi. It is this asymmetry in the destruction rate that generates the asymmetry
in the behavior of adjustment of the economy9.
As depicted in Figure 4, the measure of active projects declines sharply at the moment
of the shock and overshoots its long-run lower steady state level. Consequently, non-traded
sector prices, real exchange rate, gross domestic product and traded sector output is also
to overshoot their downward adjustment. Table 2 (Case 1) compares the impact eﬀect and
long-run eﬀect of an economy as it moves between zlo and zhi. For the same set of parameter
values, as the economy moves from zlo to zhi GDP increases on impact by 1.69% and is
higher by 5.15% in the long-run. On the other hand, as the economy moves from zhi to
zlo GDP declines on impact by 7.17% before recovering to a level that is 4.9% below the
pre-shock steady state in the long-run. Similarly, traded sector output, in response to the
expansionary shock raises on impact by 0.71% while declining on impact by 7.53%, the RER
appreciates on impact by 3% and depreciates on impact by 3.16%. The measure of active
projects similarly adjusts asymmetrically with monotonic expansions rising from 0.22% to
4.54% and non-monotonic contractions associated with a sharp decline on impact by 7.17%
as compared to a long-run deviation of 4.34%. Since project contraction is associated
with exit of foreign investors from the project in this model, the sharp contraction implies
sharp reversals in participation rates of foreign investors in the emerging economy. The
overshooting results in households borrowing to smooth consumption. The deviation in
current account de￿cit (as a ratio of pre-shock GDP) is 0.006%.
It should be clear that the adjustment paths diﬀer from what we would have obtained
had we used a quadratic adjustment cost investment model. The mechanism that generates
this asymmetry is also very diﬀerent from the ￿occasionally binding credit constraint￿ mech-
anism described in the literature where asymmetries are infrequent events and its occurence
9Mortenson and Pissarides (1994) describe this asymmetry in the destruction rate as it arises in a model
of job ￿ows when workers and vacancies match via a matching technology to create jobs. One requires some
degree of persistence in the idiosyncratic return to obtain asymmetry in the adjustment process.
19depends on the initial net foreign asset position of the economy. In the search framework,
the asymmetry is always present (even when the shocks are partly anticipated and agents
incorporate this in their decisions), however its magnitude varies with the extent to which
zhi and zlo diﬀer and the consequent divergence in ￿ θ
hi
and ￿ θ
lo
.
The quantitative predictions of the model are reported in Figures 3 and 4 and in Table
2 and 3. The solid line in Figures 3 and 4 plot the response to a permanent unanticipated
change in z and the dashed line plots the response to permanent unanticipated changes
in z a n di nt h e￿xed cost of investment φ. In the benchmark case φhi is equal to 4 and
φlo is set at 3.9. In the absence of precise estimates from emerging market economy data
for certain parameters used in the model the quantitative predictions have to be examined
with caution. Further, we only look at permanent shocks. Despite this, it is illustrative to
note that the eﬀects on GDP, m, Yt,p,RER,C c a nb eq u i t el a r g ei nt h i sf r a m e w o r ka n d
comparable to numbers obtained from the data. When the shock to z is combined with
the 2.5% shock to φ the eﬀects on all the variables reported in the table rise substantially.
Table 1 suggests that the long-run eﬀect on the real exchange rate of a move from
'
zlo,φhi“
to
'
zhi,φlo“
is 12.4%,t h ee ﬀect on GDP is 29.8%,o nc o n s u m p t i o ni s13.6% and on traded
sector output is 30.3%. Similarly, the reversals in these economies is also far more dramatic
as compared to Case 1 in Table 2. In the Sudden Stops literature, Calvo-Reinhart (1999)
document an average real GDP contraction of 13.3% during the recent crisis episodes for
the group of Argentina, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico and Thailand. Mendoza (2001) analyzes
time series date for Mexico and his estimates are reported in Table 3 alongside the numbers
we obtain for the impact eﬀect of a move from zhi to zlo. Further, we qualitatively match the
observation about sudden stops that recessions have tended to be very short lived since our
model generates expansions in GDP immediately following the ￿rst period of the shock10.
Table 4 illustrates the sensitivity of the quantitative eﬀects obtained to initial parameter
choices in φ. The main point is that the magnitude of the eﬀects are larger, the greater the
impact on the adjustment hazard rate of the shock. A high initial value of φ will imply a high
10Comparing our estimates to Rebelo-Vegh (1995), a case can be made that incorporating the real eﬀects
of investors subject to information frictions can be important in quantitatively matching the extent of
movements in macro aggregates observed in these economies.
20cut-oﬀ, a low adjustment hazard rate and a larger pool of searching investors. Changes in z
and φ will have a larger eﬀect in this case, as opposed to the scenario where the adjustment
hazard rates are already high and the measure of searching investors in steady state is low.
The presence of foreign investors generates bene￿ts to the local economy in terms of
increasing their income through project creation. If we compare the steady state welfare of
an economy in which households can trade in the risk-free bond but there are no searching
foreign investors, to the steady state welfare of the economy we describe in this paper, the
welfare gains are very large11. Further, we can evaluate the welfare eﬀects on the current
economy of shocks to traded sector productivity. When the economy is initially in the
bad state, {zlo}, the eﬀect of a switch to the good state {zhi} is for welfare to rise. The
compensating variation in terms of per-period consumption for an economy in steady state
with {zlo} is calculated to be 3.02%. Similarly when the economy moves from the good state
to the bad state, the welfare loss measured as the compensating variation for an economy
in steady state with {zhi} is a 1.97% drop in per -period consumption. One can examine at
this point if there is a role for policy in smoothing out the sharp reversals that we observe
in this economy. As long as the search friction exists there will remain an asymmetry in
the adjustment process. The asymmetry is however greater the larger the rise in the cut-
oﬀ that follows when the economy is hit by the bad shock. Policies that can reduce the
wedge between ￿ θ
hi
and ￿ θ
lo
can therefore reduce the extent of asymmetry in the process. For
instance, if policy makers could commit to a policy of lowering the entry cost for investors
φ, or raising the proportion of pro￿ts that accrue to investors τ, when z is low, this would
drive ￿ θ
lo
to be close to ￿ θ
hi
and smooth out reversals.
11The percentage increase in per period consumption required to generate the same level of welfare for
an economy closed to foreign investors is 200% and 230% depending upon whether {z,φ} = {1,4} or
{z,φ} = {1.065,3.9} respectively ( ﬂ B =0 ) .T h e s e l a r g e d i ﬀerences depend on our assumption than the
non-endowment production of traded goods requires foreign participation and is therefore quite high.
216C o n c l u s i o n
This paper explores the role of information imperfections in investing in emerging markets
on the propagation of shocks in these markets. We demonstrate that in the presence of
a search friction in foreign investors entry decision into emerging markets there arises a
natural asymmetry in the adjustment process of the economy to shocks. An increase in
traded sector productivity raises GDP on impact and it continues to grow to a higher
long-run level. On the other hand, a decline in traded sector productivity causes GDP to
contract in the short run by more than it does in the long-run. We examine the role of this
friction both qualitatively and quantitatively in explaining the behaviour of real exchange
rates, traded and non-traded sector output, consumption and GDP. The results suggest
an important role for such frictions in entry and exit decisions of investors in explaining the
recent boom and collapse episodes of emerging market economies in the nineteen nineties.
7A p p e n d i x
Appendix A.1: Proof for Proposition 2
Proof. It follows from equation (3) and (4) that in steady state we can express the
following
Eθ(V (θ)) = [(1 + r)φ + βEθ(V (θ))]G(￿ θ)+
Z θ∗
￿ θ
•
τπ(θ)+βδEθ(V (θ))
1 − β(1 − δ)
‚
dG(θ)
Using integration by parts, and since π0(θ)=1and from equation (4), we obtain the
following relation for Eθ(V (θ))
Eθ(V (θ)) =
￿
1
1 − β
¶"
(1 + r)φ +
τ
1 − β(1 − δ)
Z θ∗
￿ θ
(1 − G(θ))dθ
#
(A.1.1)
From equation (A.1.1) we have a negatively sloped relation between Eθ(V (θ)) and ￿ θ. From
equation (4) we obtain
τ
(1 − β(1 − δ))
h
￿ θ + χz(
1
1−α)p(
−α
1−α)
i
=( 1+r)φ +
•
β(1 − δ)(1 − β)
(1 − β(1 − δ))
‚
Eθ(V (θ)) (A.1.2)
22which determines a positively sloped relation between Eθ(V (θ)) and ￿ θ. The intersection of
(A.1.1) and (A.1.2) is necessarily unique. A higher p results in a rightward shift of equation
(A.1.2) implying a higher equilibrium cut-oﬀ and lower Eθ(V (θ)).
Appendix A. 2: Numerical Solution Algorithm
The dynamics of the model are obtained using a shooting algorithm. The steps are as
follows
(i) The economy is assumed to be in its initial steady state in period 0 a n da s s u m e dt o
reach its new steady state in period T. The steady state values are obtained numerically as
the solution to a system of non-linear equations, given the parameter values in Table 1.
(ii) Next, we guess a transition path for the relative price of non-traded goods, {p0
t}t=1,...T−1
. Given the path for pt,w ec a ns o l v ef o rt h ep a t ho f{￿ θt} and
n− −− →
Vt(θ)
o
, starting from period
(T −1) and solving backwards. The vector
− −− →
Vt(θ) is determined over 5000 grid points and the
function Vt(θ) is approximated using a spline. The equations used are the value function
(3) and the equation for the equilibrium cut-oﬀ (4). The pro￿t function is solely a function
of p a n dc o n s e q u e n t l y ,t h ee n t i r es e q u e n c eo fc u t - o ﬀs can be determined.
(iii) Give the path of {￿ θt} and the initial distribution of active projects {
− −−→
m0(θ)}, we can
determine the path of {
− −−→
mt(θ)}t=1.....T−1 according to the following relation
mt(θ)=( 1 − δ)tI(θ > max(
n
￿ θ0,...,￿ θt
o
)m0(θ)
+(1 − δ)t−1I.
n
θ ≥ max(
n
￿ θ1,...,￿ θt
oo
η1g(θ)
+(1 − δ)t−2I.
n
θ ≥ max(
n
￿ θ2,...,￿ θt
oo
η2g(θ)+..... +
+(1 − δ)I.
n
θ ≥ max{￿ θt−1,￿ θt
o
}ηt−1g(θ)+
+ηtI(θ > ￿ θt)g(θ)
where I(.) is the indicator function that takes the value 1 if the statement within brackets
is true and ηt is determined according to
ηt +( 1− δ)mt−1 =1
23and the aggregate measure of active projects is
mt =
Z ∞
￿ θt
mt (θ)dθ
=( 1 − δ)th
‡
max
n
￿ θ0,...,￿ θt
o· ηs
0
δ
+
+(1 − δ)t−1h
‡
max
n
￿ θ1,...,￿ θt
o·
ηs
1 +
+(1 − δ)t−2h
‡
max
n
￿ θ2,...,￿ θt
o·
ηs
2 + ... +
+(1 − δ)h
‡
max
n
￿ θt−1,￿ θt
o·
ηs
t−1 + h
‡
￿ θt
·
ηs
t
where h(.)=1− G(.).
(iv) Given the evolution of {
− −−→
mt(θ)},{mt} and {ηt} the equilibrium level of {Xn,t},{Yt,t},
{Bt},{rt},{CT,t} and {Cn,t} are determined from equations (17), (18), (21), (12), (13),
(14) and (15).
(v) The level of {Yn,t} is determined as the residual from the goods market clearing
condition Yn,t = Cn,t + Xn,t.
(vi) The new sequence of relative non-traded goods prices,
'
p1
t
“
is then obtained from
the output supply equation, (16). If
'
|p1
t| − |p0
t|
“
> ε, steps (ii)-(vi) are repeated using a
weighted average of the new sequence of prices {p1
t} and the previous sequence of prices
'
p0
t
“
. This process is repeated as long as
'
|pi+1
t | − |pi
t|
“
> ε (where i indexes the number
of the iteration). Also, we check to make sure that the economy has indeed converged to
its new steady state. If not, we pick a new T and repeat the steps starting from (ii).
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26Table 1: Benchmark Parameter Values 
 
Time preference rate  β   0.99 
World risk-free interest rate  r 0.01 
Fraction of spending by consumers 
on non-traded goods 
γ   0.5 
Disutility from production in 
preferences 
κ   2 
Elasticity of demand for non-traded 
goods in traded sector (
α − 1
1
) 
α   0.6 
Steady-state debt  B 1.0038 
Endowment of traded goods  ω  0.001 
 
Coefficient on interest rate premium 
 
ψ 
 
0.000742 
 
Exit rate of firms in traded sector 
 
δ 
 
0.025 
L θ of uniform distribution  L θ   1 
H θ of uniform distribution  H θ   5 
Share of profits accruing to foreign 
investors 
τ   0.8 
Per-period fixed cost of investment 
to foreign investor 
φ   4 
Aggregate traded sector productivity z 1 
 Table 2: Impact Effect and Long-Run Effect of permanent shocks to traded sector productivity 
(z) and fixed cost to foreign investor (φ ) (percentage changes) 
 
 
Case 1: 
 
} 4 , 065 . 1 { } , { } 4 , 1 { } , { = → =
hi hi hi lo z z φ φ  
 
 
} 4 , 1 { } , { } 4 , 065 . 1 { } , { = → =
hi lo hi hi z z φ φ  
  Impact Effect 
 
Long Run Effect  Impact Effect  Long Run Effect 
GDP 
 
1.69 5.15 -7.17  -4.90 
RER 
 
3.00 3.15 -3.16  -3.06 
M 
 
0.22 4.54 -7.17  -4.34 
C 
 
2.9 2.75  -2.57  -2.67 
YT 
 
0.71 4.96 -7.53  -4.73 
       
 
Case 2: 
 
} 9 . 3 , 065 . 1 { } , { } 4 , 1 { } , { = → =
lo hi hi lo z z φ φ
 
 
} 4 , 1 { } , { } 9 . 3 , 065 . 1 { } , { = → =
hi lo lo hi z z φ φ
 
  Impact Effect 
 
Long Run Effect  Impact Effect  Long Run Effect 
GDP 
 
5.84 29.8  -36.49  -22.97 
RER 
 
11.58 12.4 -11.72  -11.03 
M 
 
1.95 32.6  -40.96  -24.6 
C 
 
14.49 13.6 -11.34  -12.03 
YT 
 
0.81 30.3  -39.82  -23.25 
 Table 3: Sharp Reversals  
( percentage changes) 
 
   
Model Estimates* 
 
Estimates from Data** 
%∆GDP  -7.17 -7.93 
%p  -6.22 -24.4 
%∆C  -2.57 -8.56 
 
%∆YT 
 
-7.53 
 
-10.14 
%∆YN  -0.59 -6.0 
 
* Impact Effect of a 6% decline in traded sector productivity. 
** Refers to the estimates reported in Mendoza (2001) for Mexico. 
 
 
Table 4: Sensitivity of Long-Run Effects to initial adjustment hazard rate 
(Variations in φ ) 
 
  
0 . 4 = φ  
 
9 . 3 = φ  
 
75 . 3 = φ  
 
5 . 3 = φ  
%∆Adjustment Hazard  75.44 44.01  22.91  11.37 
%∆GDP  29.8 14.74  6.46  2.79 
%∆RER  12.4 6.91  3.58  1.99 
 
%∆m 
 
32.6 
 
15.68 
 
6.59 
 
2.57 
%∆C  13.6 7.13  3.30  1.54 
%∆YT  30.3 14.79  6.35  2.62 
 
Values in the table correspond to long-run effects of a permanent 6.5% increase in traded sector 
productivity and 2.5% decline in the fixed cost to investors, where the initial steady state 
parameters correspond to the benchmark parameters with the exception of φ which we vary as in 
the first row above.   
 
 
 
Figure 3: Solid line represents the impulse response to increase in traded sector productivity when the economy moves 
form {z
lo }={1} to{ z
hi }={1.065}(the relevant axis is the left Y axis).  The dashed line represents the impulse response 
to an increase in traded sector productivity and lower fixed cost for foreign investor: {z
lo ,  hi φ }={1,4} to  
{z
hi ,  lo φ }={1.065,3.9} (relevant axis is the right Y axis). Values represent percentage deviation from the initial 
steady state.  
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Figure 3(cont.) : Solid line represents the impulse response to increase in traded sector productivity when the economy 
moves form {z
lo }={1} to{ z
hi }={1.065}(the relevant axis is the left Y axis).  The dashed line represents the impulse 
response to an increase in traded sector productivity and lower fixed cost for foreign investor: {z
lo ,  hi φ }={1,4} to  
{z
hi ,  lo φ }={1.065,3.9} (relevant axis is the right Y axis). Values represent percentage deviation from the initial 
steady state.  
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Figure 4: Solid line represents the impulse response to decrease in traded sector productivity when the economy moves 
form { z
hi }={1.065} to {z
lo }={1} (the relevant axis is the left Y axis).  The dashed line represents the impulse response 
to a decrease in traded sector productivity and higher fixed cost for foreign investor: {z
hi ,  lo φ }={1.065,3.9} to {z
lo , 
hi φ }={1,4}  (relevant axis is the right Y axis). Values represent percentage deviation from the initial steady state.  
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Figure 4(cont.): Solid line represents the impulse response to decrease in traded sector productivity when the economy 
moves form { z
hi }={1.065} to {z
lo }={1} (the relevant axis is the left Y axis).  The dashed line represents the impulse 
response to a decrease in traded sector productivity and higher fixed cost for foreign investor: {z
hi ,  lo φ }={1.065,3.9} 
to {z
lo ,  hi φ }={1,4}  (relevant axis is the right Y axis). Values represent percentage deviation from the initial steady 
state.  
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